
































































































Nonprofit Sector and Part-Time Work: An Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data of
Child Care Workers
I. Introduction
The nonprofit sector constitutes a significant, and expanding segment of the U.S.
economy.  The number of private nonprofit organizations increased by almost 19 percent
between 1989 and 1997, from 1,262,000 to 1,498,000 (Urban Institute 2000).  The number of
national nonprofit associations increased by 56 percent between 1980 and 1997, reaching
almost 23,000 in 1997 (Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2000). Employment in the nonprofit
sector increased from 7.1 million full-time equivalent (FTE) paid workers in 1990 to 9.6
million FTE workers in 1995; and in 1995 nonprofit employment accounted for 8.8 percent of
the GDP in the U.S. (Salamon et al. 1999). There are theoretical reasons to believe that
economic behavior of nonprofit enterprises may be different from their for-profit counterparts
(Lakdawalla and Philipson 1998, Rose-Ackerman 1986, Hansmann 1980).  One such
difference pertains to wage-setting behavior between nonprofit and for-profit firms.  Nonprofit
enterprises are expected to create rents for their workers, which would translate into wage
mark-ups.  Alternatively, if nonprofit workers differ from for-profit workers in their altruism,
this may translate into a nonprofit ￿labor donation￿ and lower nonprofit wages.   The
empirical evidence on nonprofit wage differentials is ambiguous.  As explained in Section II
below, the literature is far from having reached a consensus on the issue.
Around 17 percent of all workers, and around one-quarter of all female workers work
part-time (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000).  The fact that average wages of part-time workers
are less than those of full-time workers with similar characteristics raises the question of
whether part-time jobs are ￿bad￿ jobs  (Blank 1990).
1   The substantial size of part-time
employment makes this an important, and as yet unresolved, question.
Using an extraordinarily detailed employer-employee matched data set, this paper
addresses two questions: Are wages and compensation of workers who work in the nonprofit
sector lower than their counterparts in the for-profit sector; and are part-time jobs bad jobs?
                                                     
1  An investigation of whether certain jobs are bad jobs requires data on  worker compensation as well
as controls for job characteristics, which is not always possible because of the paucity of data.  This2
We find that both answers are ￿no￿ for child care workers.  Although we find evidence of
labor-donation for nonprofit workers, we document substantial nonprofit premiums in wages
and compensation. Similarly, we find that part-time jobs are ￿good￿ jobs.   These results are
not likely due to some idiosyncratic characteristic of the child care industry.  As we
demonstrate in the paper, the raw full-time and nonprofit differentials observed in our data
show similar patterns when compared to a number of industries of the 1990 census data.
Section II gives the background, and puts the contribution of this paper into
perspective.  Section III presents the model and the data.  Section IV describes the results,
section V presents the sensitivity analysis, and section VI is the conclusion.
II.  Background
As summarized by Preston (1988), the theory of property rights predicts that nonprofit
institutions may generate rents for their workers.  This is partly because there is no owner to
which the nonprofit manager is held accountable, which lessens the incentive for managers of
nonprofit organizations to operate efficiently.  As a result, there is reason to expect that
nonprofit enterprises pay higher wages to comparable workers than their for-profit
counterparts.  On the other hand, it can be argued that nonprofit workers may have preferences
that are different from for-profit workers.  More precisely, some workers may be willing to
work at nonprofit institutions at a lower wage and/or compensation in comparison to wages
and compensation they could have obtained elsewhere.  This labor donation could take place if
nonprofit workers care about the social value of the good or service they produce more than
for-profit workers (Preston 1989)
  However, the empirical evidence on the nonprofit wage differential is ambiguous.
Most of this ambiguity seems to stem from inadequate data sets employed to address the
question.  The investigation of nonprofit wage differentials takes two general forms.  The first
one is the analysis of firm-level data, such as in Preston (1988), who found that in the
competitive segment of the day care industry, there is no significant difference in firm-level
salaries between nonprofit and for-profit firms, whereas there is a 5 to 10 percent nonprofit
differential in the government subsidized segment of the industry.  Mocan and Viola (1997)
investigated the determinants of wages and compensation in 398 child care centers.  They
                                                                                                                                                                          
issue is discussed below in more detail.3
found a positive nonprofit premium, which became statistically insignificant once sector
breakdowns (e.g. religious center, publicly funded center) are controlled for.
A more refined investigation is done with micro data, where the determinants of worker
wages are analyzed as a function of, among other factors, nonprofit status.  Some analysts
estimated wage regressions by including a dummy variable to indicate sector affiliation of the
worker (e.g. Shackett and Trapani 1987,  Borjas, Frech III and Ginsburg 1983)  The findings
of these studies may not be reliable because of the potential endogeneity of the sector dummy.
As argued above, it is conceivable that workers who choose to work in the nonprofit sector
may be systematically different from workers who work in the for-profit sector.  If
unobservable worker characteristics which influence sector choice also impact workers￿ wages
one would obtain biased estimates of the sector impact.  For example, Weisbrod (1983)
estimated separate earnings functions for lawyers employed in public sector firms and those
employed in private firms.  He reported that public sector lawyers received lower wages than
private sector lawyers. Using the same data set and by controlling for self-selection into sectors
Goddeeris (1988) found no evidence that public sector lawyers accepted earning sacrifices,
underlining the importance of selection bias.  There are only a few papers that addressed self-
selection of workers into sectors.  Holtmann and Idson (1993) and Preston (1989) used the
two-stage approach developed by Lee (1978) and Heckman (1979).  Ruhm and Borkoski
(2000) exploited the panel component of the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation
Groups to control for self-selection.
For the most part, recent research on part-time wage differentials has paid attention to
non-random selection into part-time work (Hotchkiss 1991, Blank 1990, Simpson 1986).
However, most of the work in this literature faced challenges pertaining to measurement error
in key variables (such as wages and hours), and a failure to control for non-wage benefits and
other job attributes.  As explained by Montgomery and Cosgrove (1995), the data sets
employed in these studies did not allow for detailed controls for firm effects, or even
occupation effects.   While most papers reported a negative part-time wage differential
(Montgomery and Cosgrove 1995, Simpson 1986),  Blank (1990) found a wage differential in
favor of part-time workers.
This paper brings together these two strands of literature: the wage setting practices of
nonprofit enterprises, and the investigation of relative wages of part-time workers in4
comparison to their full-time counterparts.  The employer-employee matched data set used in
the analysis not only includes very detailed characteristics of workers and firms, it also allows
for measurement of variables with more precision than before.  For example, most studies that
used national data sets had to impute worker wages using annual wage or salary income and
annual hours (Leete forthcoming,  Main and Reilly 1992, Blank 1990).  They were also forced
to impute certain human capital measures of the workers (e.g. experience).   Similarly, data
obtained from workers are likely to contain substantial error regarding the nonprofit status of
the establishment they are working for (Leete forthcoming, Ruhm and Borkoski 2000).  By
contrast, in our data set the information pertaining to the firm is obtained from child care
centers￿ directors and from their financial statements. All worker information such as workers￿
experience in the field, experience outside the field, and tenure on the job, is obtained by
surveying the workers directly.
The richness of the data set allows for tests of several interesting hypotheses, which
were not directly tested before.  For example, a question had been included in the survey given
to workers to test the labor donation hypothesis.  Workers were asked about the main reason
for their choice of the child care industry.  Among the alternatives given to them was: ￿I think
this is an important job someone needs to do.￿  We test whether nonprofit workers who chose
this alternative as their main reason of employment face a wage or compensation penalty as
predicted by the labor donation hypothesis.
Using the information on the types and dollar amount of nonwage benefits offered by
the centers, and the information on the type of staff which receives these benefits, we are able
to calculate hourly compensation, and conduct the analysis for compensation as well. We allow
for endogenous selection of sector (nonprofit vs. for-profit) as well as hours (part-time versus
full-time).  Controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity, the model is estimated for
both wages and compensation using full-information maximum-likelihood.
III.  Empirical Implementation
The model includes two selection equations and four sectoral wage equations.  One
selection equation allocates child care workers to the for-profit or the nonprofit sector, while
the other one allocates them to either full-time or part-time work.  The cross-classification of5
these two selection rules partitions workers into four mutually exclusive categories.
2  The
selection between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors and between full-time and part-time work
can be summarized by the following equations.
(1) PR
*




i=Yi   +   i
ft
where PR
* stands for unobserved sentiment that determines the attachment to the for-
profit sector, and FT
*  is the unobserved tendency to choose full-time work, such that PR=1
(the worker chooses the for-profit sector) if PR
*>0, and PR=0 otherwise.  Similarly, if
FT
*>0 then the worker chooses full-time work and the dichotomous variable FT takes the
value of 1, and FT=0 otherwise. The vectors X and Y are variables that determine the
propensity to work in the for-profit sector, and to work full-time, respectively.
We specify linear sectoral wage equations as follows.
(3) Wi
ft-np=Zi   +   i
ft-np
(4) Wi
pt-np=Zi   +   i
pt-np
(5) Wi
ft-pr=Ki   +   i
ft-pr
(6)  Wi
pt-pr=Ki   +   i
pt-pr,
where the superscript ft stands for full-time, pt stands for part-time, np is nonprofit and pr
represents for-profit.  Wi stands for the wage rate of the ith worker.  The vector Z contains
variables determining the wages in the nonprofit sector, and K is the vector of variables that
determines wages in the for-profit sector.   Some elements of Z are naturally missing from K,
and vice versa, which facilitates identification. For example, there are no unionized or
religious centers among for-profits.  Similarly, no for-profit center is publicly owned or
regulated.  On the other hand, there are no nonprofit centers which are part of a national chain
or which provide 24-hour care.  Thus, the variables representing the union status, the religious
affiliation, and public ownership of the centers are included in Z, but are missing from K.
Along the same lines, the variables that represent whether or not the center is part of a national
chain and whether the center provides 24-hour care are in K, but are missing from Z.  The
variables that represent family background such as household income, marital status of the
                                                     
2  Another potential selection is into the labor force.  We do not address it here because of the lack of
data on nonworkers.6
worker, and the number of children are included in the selection equations, but they are
omitted from the wage equations.   To the extent that the latent variables that measure the
propensity to work full-time and the propensity to work in the for-profit sector are influenced
by potential wages in these sectors, the variables that are included in Z and K should be
included in X and Y.  However, variables that are affiliated exclusively with one sector (such
as the union status) are not included in the selection equations.
It is plausible to think that the error term of the sector selection equation may be
correlated with the error term of the full-time selection equation.  That is, workers￿ unobserved
preferences for sector choice may impact their choice of full-time versus part-time work.
These disturbances may also be correlated with the disturbances of the wage equations:
unobserved worker characteristics which influence sector and full-time choice decisions may
impact wages.
To account for this potential correlation in the errors of the equations, we model the
error structure as
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where u1,￿, u6 are mutually independent disturbances with mean zero, and j symbolizes the
common factors that impacts error terms .  The factor loadings, j, allow for the impact of the
common factors to vary cross equations. u￿s and ￿s are independent of the explanatory
variables.  The factors (￿s) are unobserved variables that generate worker heterogeneity.  We
allow for two factors to account for the correlations among equations.  For example, one factor7
might represent unobserved motivation, and the other one may represent tastes for work.
In principle, one can estimate this system by imposing a parametric joint distribution
for the two sources unobserved of heterogeneity and integrating out over its distribution.  The
drawback to this approach is that it requires computing multi-dimensional integrals, which is
not feasible with traditional methods.  Furthermore, it requires strong assumptions about the
exact distribution of the heterogeneity.  In related contexts, it has been shown that the results
can be sensitive to departures from normality (Goldberger 1983, Arabmazar and Schmidt
1982).
In this paper we use the discrete factor method (DFM) which, unlike standard
selection corrections, estimates a semiparametric distribution to approximate the distribution
between the error term of the selection and wage equations. In this approach the distribution of
the ν￿s is approximated with a step function and integrated out through a weighted sum of
probabilities (Heckman and Singer 1984, Mroz 1999).  Following Mroz (1999), we assume
that  is governed by a discrete distribution
(13) Prob(=￿k)=k;   k=1,..., K; k 0,  kk=1,
where ￿k are the points of support of the distribution, and k are the probability
weights.  The  ￿k￿s, k￿s, ￿s are parameters to be estimated.  K is specified a priori, and the
six equations are estimated jointly with full-information maximum likelihood.
3   Mroz (1999)
demonstrates that when the true correlation of the error terms is normal, DFM performs well
in comparison to estimators which assume normality; and DFM performs better than
normality-based  estimators when the underlying distribution is non-normal.  (See Blau and
Hagy (1998), Hu (1999), Blau and Mocan (1999) and Mocan, Tekin and Zax (2000) for
applications of the discrete factor model).
IV.  The Data
We use a recent data set obtained from child care centers in California, Colorado,
Connecticut and North Carolina.
4  The data are based upon a stratified random sample of 398
                                                     
3  The likelihood function is presented in the Appendix.
4  The data were compiled with the collaboration of economists, psychologists and child development
experts from University of Colorado at Denver, Yale University, University of North Carolina at8
day care centers (approximately 100 centers from each participating state), with equal
representation of for-profit and nonprofit programs, providing full-time year-round care.
They were obtained by actual visits to the centers during the spring of 1993.  Data collectors
gathered in-depth financial information on center costs and revenues, various non-wage
benefits offered to teachers, aides and part-time staff, ownership and union status, and a host
of other center characteristics through on-site interviews and reviews of center records with
center administrators or owners. In each of the 398 centers in the data set, two classrooms
were randomly selected: one from the older children (30 months and older) and one from the
younger groups. Teaching staff in these classrooms were asked to complete a survey regarding
their human capital characteristics, their pre-tax hourly wages, weekly hours of work, family
characteristics and attitudes towards work in the child care industry.   As a result, the
extraordinary detail of the data allows for control of the job environment, as well as worker
and firm characteristics with precision.
Table 1 presents average hourly wages and compensation by state, nonprofit status and
full-time status (workers who work 35 or more hours per week).
5  Cells within a box indicate
statistically significant differences (at the five percent level or less) between nonprofit and for-
profit sectors in the corresponding column. For example, in Colorado the average wage of
full-time workers in the nonprofit sector is $6.38; the average wage in the for-profit sector is
$5.68, and the difference is statistically significant as indicated by the box around these
means.  Entries with a star signify statistically significant differences between full-time and
part-time means in the corresponding row.  For example, in California, in the for-profit
sector, the mean wage for full-time workers is $8.12 while the mean wage of part-time
workers is $7.19; and the difference is statistically significant.
Table 1 illustrates raw nonprofit wage and compensation differentials.  In Connecticut
and North Carolina both wages and compensation are higher in nonprofit centers than for-
profit centers for both full-time and part-time workers.  The same is true for full-time workers
in Colorado.  Part-time workers￿ compensation is higher in nonprofit centers in California.
Table 1 also displays raw wage and compensation differences in favor of full-timers.  With the
exception of wages in Connecticut nonprofit centers, average wages and compensation are
                                                                                                                                                                          
Chapel Hill and UCLA.  The details of the data and data collection can be found in Mocan (1997).9
higher for full-timers, and the differences are especially prevalent in California and North
Carolina.
Raw full-time and nonprofit differentials are presented in a more compact fashion in
Table 2. We ran linear regressions of the logarithm of wages and compensation on state
dummies and a full-time dummy, separately for nonprofit and for-profit centers to obtain the
information displayed in the top half of Table 2.  The logarithm of wages and compensation
are run on state dummies and a for-profit dummy separately for full-time and part-time
workers to obtain the information displayed in the bottom half of the table.  The values in
parentheses are percentage differences. According to Table 2, controlling for state differences,
full-time wages are not different from part-time wages in nonprofit centers, but full-time
compensation is greater than part-time compensation.  In for-profit centers both wages and
compensation are greater for full-time workers.  The bottom half of the Table demonstrates
that there exist nonprofit mark-ups in both wages and compensation.
Table 3 presents the descriptive characteristics of the workers.  Sixty-five percent work
full-time.  In Colorado, 80 percent of for-profit workers are full-time, while the ratio is 69
percent for nonprofit workers.  In other states there is no statistically significant difference
between sectors regarding the proportion of workers who work full-time. Even though 97
percent of the workers are female, as will be seen in the results section, gender turns out to be
a significant determinant of wages for part-time workers.  Experience is the number of years
worked in the field of early education and child care.  The workers are instructed that work
means 10 or more hours a week.  It includes paid and non-paid experience, and includes time
at the particular center they are currently working.
The highest degree is a high school diploma for 19 percent of the workers, and another
19 percent have college degrees.  Fourteen percent have community college degrees.  Assistant
teacher is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 is the worker is an assistant
teacher, and zero is he/she is a teacher in the classroom.  Own kids is the number of children
(birth, adopted, foster or step children) living with the worker full or part-time. Own kids at
center is a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the worker￿s own children are attending
the center.
Organization is equal to one if the worker belongs to any professional organization,
                                                                                                                                                                          
5  The measurement of compensation is described in the appendix.10
such as the National Association for Education of Young Children. The workers were asked
about the main reason for their choice of work in the field of early education and child care.
The alternatives given were: it was the highest paying job at the time; it is a desirable job
(pleasant job environment); low cost of working; flexible working hours; and this is an
important job that someone needs to do.  If the worker chose this last alternative, then the
dummy variable Important job takes the value of one; and zero otherwise.  This variable is a
direct indicator of the intrinsic value to the individual of working in the child care sector.  As
such, it allows for a direct test of the ￿labor donation￿ hypothesis; that is, all else the same,
individuals with this attitude are expected to command lower wages, especially in the nonprofit
sector.
Single is equal to one if the worker is single, living alone with a roommate or parent(s)
and zero otherwise.  Married is another dummy variable to indicate whether the person is
married, or living with a significant other.  The left-out category is whether the person is
divorced or separated, a widow or widower.  Household income is measured by six
dichotomous variables.  Forty-two percent of the workers have household incomes less than
$20,000.
Table 3A presents worker descriptive statistics by type of worker.  A star indicates that
the means are statistically different between for-profit and nonprofit, or between full-time and
part-time workers at the five-percent level or better.  For example, nonprofit workers are older
than for-profit workers (35 years of age vs. 31 years), and they also have more tenure (45
months vs. 30 months).  Similarly, nonprofit workers have almost one more year of
experience, are more likely to be a member of a professional organization, and are more likely
to be black or Hispanic.  Nonprofit workers have an average of 0.24 more children.  On the
other hand, 20 percent of for-profit workers have children at the center, while the rate is 11
percent for nonprofit workers. Twenty-three percent of for-profit workers are have a college
degree, while the rate is 15 percent for nonprofit workers.  There is no difference between for-
profit and nonprofit workers regarding their household income.
Part-time workers are older than full-time workers, and they have more job tenure.  A
higher proportion of full-time workers is single, and a smaller proportion is married.  Fourteen
percent of full-time workers are black, while the rate is 10 percent for part-time workers.
Full-time workers are more likely to have come from poorer households.11
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics of center characteristics.   For-profit takes the
value of 1 if the center is for-profit, and 0 if it is nonprofit.  National chain i s  a l s o  a
dichotomous variable, indicating whether the center is part of a for-profit national chain.  On-
site is set to 1 if the center is a worksite child care center, and zero otherwise.  Publicly
Regulated is 1 if the center receives public money, either from the state or federal government,
tied to higher standards (above and beyond normal licensing regulations), and 0 otherwise.
This group includes Head Start programs, centers where 20 percent or more of their
enrollment constitute special needs children, special preschool programs sponsored by the State
or Federal Department of Education, and other special programs in Connecticut and
California.
Publicly owned is set to 1 for centers that are owned and operated by public agencies.
Examples include public colleges, hospitals, and city departments of family services.   Publicly
supported is another dichotomous variable which takes the value of 1 if the center is not
publicly owned or operated, but receives more than 50 percent of its revenue from public
grants, public fees and USDA reimbursement.  Religious is 1 if the center has a religious
affiliation (e.g. church-based centers), and zero otherwise.  Union is 1, if teachers and/or aides
are unionized.  There are 18 unionized centers in the sample, and all are nonprofit centers.  Of
these, 14 are publicly owned centers (Publicly owned), 2 are publicly supported centers
(Publicly supported) and 2 are religious centers.
Percent subsidized represents the proportion of children that are subsidized by a
government or other agency, such as the State or County Department of Social or Human
Services, United Way, etc.  Table 4 also displays information about various programs offered
by centers, such as evening care, sick care, and before-and-school care.
Following an extensive literature that investigates the impact of firm size on earnings
(Troske 1999, Main and Reilly 1993, Brown and Medoff 1989, Evans and Leighton 1989), we
add the size of the child care center, measured by full-time equivalent children (FTE Children)
in the wage and compensation equations. Local unemployment can depress wages through
various non-competitive mechanisms (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994, Chapter 3).
Alternatively, there can be a positive relationship between wages and unemployment, because
firms can provide compensating wage differentials to workers in the spirit of the Harris and12
Todero (1970) and Hall (1970) models.  To investigate this effect, we include the
unemployment rate in the models. Unemployment is the unemployment rate in the city where
the center is located.  The zip codes of the centers are used to determine the city in which the
center is located.  The unemployment rates for the corresponding cities are obtained from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Division. For the cities where
BLS figures were unavailable, the unemployment rates are imputed as the average
unemployment rates of the neighboring cities within a 20 mile radius.
IV. Results
Equations (1)-(6) are estimated jointly with full-information maximum likelihood under
the error structure displayed by (7)-(12).  The results are based on five points of support (K=5
in Equation 13). Table 5 displays the estimated coefficients of the for-profit selection and full-
time selection equations.  Education has a positive impact on the propensity to work full-time.
Having a graduate degree makes it more likely to choose the for-profit sector. Single and
married individuals are less likely to choose work in the for-profit sector in comparison to
divorced and widowed ones, but singles are more likely to work full-time.  Hispanics and
blacks are less likely to choose the for-profit sector, and are more likely to work full-time.
Ruhm and Borkoski (2000) find that economy-wide low average nonprofit wages reflect the
concentration of nonprofit jobs in low-paying industries.   They indicate that this could be
because of the selection of disadvantaged groups or low quality workers into these industries.
Here we find that in a narrowly defined industry, blacks and Hispanics self-select into the
nonprofit sector.
Being a member of a professional child care organization has a negative impact on the
probability to work in the for-profit sector. Workers from households with an annual
household income less than $50,000 are more likely to work full-time in comparison to
workers from households with incomes greater than $50,000.  An increase in the number of
children of the worker has a negative impact on the propensity to choose the for-profit sector
as well as to work full-time.  Local unemployment has no impact on the choice of sector, but it
has a negative impact on the probability of working full-time.
Table 6 displays the estimated coefficients of the four wage equations.  The dependent
variables are the logarithm of wages.  The coefficients of Tenure and Experience are positive13
and significantly different from zero in all wage equations.  One additional year of tenure
increases wages by 2.4 percent for part-time workers in both sectors (tenure is measured in
months).   For full-time workers the return to tenure is 1.2 percent in the for-profit sector, and
0.5 percent in the nonprofit sector. The return to experience is similar between full-time and
part-time workers within sector, but the returns are higher in the nonprofit sector.  Experience
outside child care is rewarded most heavily for part-time nonprofit workers.
Education is rewarded more in the nonprofit sector. In the nonprofit sector workers
with at least a high school diploma earn wages that are higher than comparable workers with
no high school degree. For for-profit workers, education has a wage premium (in comparison
to no high school diploma) if the worker has a community college education or higher. Lack of
special training in child care is associated with lower wages in both sectors for both types of
workers, while the penalty is higher in the nonprofit sector.
Table 7 presents the results of a series of hypothesis tests pertaining to the equality of
the coefficients of human capital variables.
6   The sign of the calculated t-statistic reveals the
direction of the difference between the coefficients under test.  A positive t-statistic indicates
that the first coefficient under the hypothesis is greater than the second one in magnitude.
7  For
example, the first test reported in the table pertains to the hypothesis that the coefficients of
tenure are equal to each other in for-profit and nonprofit sectors for full-time workers.  The
calculated t-value is 3.627, which indicates that the coefficients are different from each other,
and the for-profit coefficient is larger.
As Table 7 demonstrates there are differences between for-profit and nonprofit centers
regarding the manner in which human capital characteristics affect wages.  For full-time
workers, the return to tenure is higher in for-profit centers, but the return to experience, return
to a college degree and to a graduate degree are higher in nonprofit centers.  Section II shows
that experience in the child care sector, other experience, and a graduate degree are rewarded
more in the nonprofit sector for part-time workers.  Similarly, the lack of special training in
child care lowers wages of part-time workers more in the nonprofit sector.  On the other hand,
                                                     
6 The hypothesis tests utilize the information reported in Table 6 along with the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimated coefficients.
7  The exception is the test pertaining to the coefficients of Special Training.  Because these coefficients
are always negative, a positive  t-statistic indicates that the first coefficient is smaller than the second
one in absolute value.14
a community college degree has a higher return in the for-profit sector.   With the exception of
Other Experience in Section III and Experience in Section IV, all significant t-values have
negative signs in Sections III and IV.  This demonstrates that part-time coefficients are larger
in magnitude than full-time coefficients in both for-profit (Section III) and nonprofit centers
(Section IV), and indicates that the return to education is higher for part-time workers in both
sectors.
Coming back to Table 6, we see that female part-time workers earn 11 percent and
four percent less, respectively, in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors in comparison to their
male counterparts. Race is also a determinant of wages, where blacks and Hispanics receive
positive premiums, and white and Asian part-time workers in the nonprofit sector command
lower wages.
The labor donation hypothesis states that workers in the nonprofit sector are more
concerned about the nature of the service they are providing, and therefore they would be
willing to work for a wage which is less than they could have earned elsewhere. The
dichotomous variable Important job takes the value of one if the worker indicated that the
primary reason for his/her choice of the child care sector was that it was ￿an important job
someone needed to do.￿  Thus, to the extent that this variable is capturing the attitudes toward
labor donation, the coefficient of Important job should be negative in the nonprofit wage
equation.  Table 6 shows that the coefficient of important job is negative for both full-time and
part-time workers in the nonprofit sector, with a bigger magnitude for full-time workers.  It  is
positive in the for-profit sector, although statistically significant only for full-time for-profit
workers. This is an interesting result, which supports the labor donation hypothesis for
nonprofit workers.  It also suggests that this particular attitude may be correlated with
productivity, which is rewarded in the for-profit sector.
Being a member of a professional organization (Organization) has a positive impact on
wages, although it is not significant for part-time for-profit workers.  The positive relationship
between membership to a professional child care organization and wages may emerge because
member workers may be rewarded for providing a signal of dedication to early child care
education.  Alternatively, membership may be correlated with effort and productivity.
Job title has an impact on wages of all types of workers.  If the worker is an assistant
teacher his/her wage is lower in comparison to teachers in the regime.  The discrepancy is15
especially prevalent for part-time nonprofit assistant teachers, where their wages are 15 percent
lower than comparable teachers in the same sector.  All else the same, if the worker is working
in an infant-toddler room, his/her wage is lower in comparison to workers who are working in
preschool or kindergarten/school age classrooms.  This may be because serving infant-toddlers
is perceived as an easier job than serving older children.
 Center characteristics have significant impacts on wages.  For example, wages in on-
site centers are substantially higher for both full-time and part-time workers in both sectors.
For-profit centers, which are part of a national chain, offer wages to full-timers and part-timers
that are six percent and 12 percent lower, respectively, in comparison to non-chain for-profit
centers.  If the center is publicly supported, then the wages of full-timers are 12 percent lower
in comparison to other full-time workers in other nonprofit centers.  On the other hand,
publicly supported centers offer a six percent wage premium to part-time nonprofit workers.
Publicly owned centers in the nonprofit sector generate wage premiums to their workers.
Publicly regulated nonprofit centers￿ wages are higher for full-time workers, but lower for
part-time workers.  Wages are three-to-four percent lower in religious centers.
There is a substantial union wage premium in nonprofit centers.  Unionized nonprofit
centers provide a 22 percent wage premium to both full-time and part-time workers.  The
union variable in the analysis indicates whether or not the center is unionized.  The impact of
this union variable on part-time wages has two possible explanations.  The first explanation is
that part-time workers are also covered by the union.  Alternatively, part-time workers are not
covered by the union, but the union impact on part-time wages reflects a spillover effect.  We
attempted to contact the unionized centers in the data set to ask whether part-time workers
were also covered by the union in 1993.  We could not reach four out of the 12 centers either
because they were not in operation any longer, or their phone numbers have changed.  Four of
the remaining eight centers indicated that part-time workers were also covered by the union.
One center indicated that part-timers were not covered by the union, and three centers could
not answer the question.  So, the channel through which the union impact on part-time wages
operates remains unclear.
Local unemployment has a negative impact on part-time nonprofit workers￿ wages.
Larger for-profit centers pay a wage premium to both full-time and part-time workers which is
consistent with the literature on size differentials (see Troske 1999).   On the other hand, there16
is a negative relationship between center size and wages in the nonprofit sector.   Older centers
pay lower wages to full-time workers, but higher wages to part-timers. Economic background
of the parents and children at the center is measured by the proportion of children who are
subsidized.  An increase in the proportion of subsidized children is negatively related to part-
time wages, as well as full-time nonprofit wages.
Other center characteristics also have significant impacts on wages.  For example, part-
week programs provide lower wages for part-time workers.  Nonprofit centers with part-day
extended care programs offer higher wages.  Head Start programs offer wages to full-time
workers that are 25 percent lower than non-Head Start nonprofit centers.  Head Start wages are
seven percent lower for part-time workers.
If nonprofit centers accept children even when they are sick (Sick care), they offer
higher wages to part-time workers.  If for-profit centers offer 24-hour care, they offer higher
wages to their part-time workers.  To the extent that serving sick children is less appealing and
more difficult than serving healthy children, from workers￿ point of view, this result may be a
reflection of a compensating wage differential. The same can be said for 24-hour case.  Along
the same lines, to the extent that having one￿s own child at the same center is a desirable job
attribute, this is expected to lower wages for workers whose children are attending the same
center.  However, in three out of four regimes, the relationship is not significantly different
from zero, and it is positive for part-time nonprofit workers. In Tables 8 and 9 we present the
estimated coefficients of the same model with hourly compensation.  Table 8 displays the
estimated selection equations, while Table 9 presents the four compensation equations.  The
results are similar to the ones obtained from wage regressions
The estimated equations enable us to investigate what a randomly chosen individual￿s
wage and compensation would be under the four possible regimes (full-time, for-profit; full-
time, nonprofit; part-time, for-profit; and part-time, nonprofit).  Using the estimated
parameters of the system and the estimated heterogeneity coefficients, we simulated the
potential wages and compensation for all workers in the sample under the four possible
regimes. That is, we calculated selection-corrected and heterogeneity-adjusted wages and
compensation that each worker would earn if assigned to a particular regime. The prediction
errors of wages and compensation are also calculated for each worker under each regime.  This
allows for the calculation of the standard errors of the means.  Calculation of the 95-percent17
confidence intervals around the means indicate that we can reject the hypotheses of the equality
of wages and compensation with the exception of full-time and part-time wages in the for-profit
sector as their confidence intervals overlap.
8  Table 10 presents the direction and the
magnitudes of the mark-ups. After controlling for selection effects and unobserved worker
heterogeneity, full-time wages are 12.5 percent lower than part-time wages in nonprofit
centers, and they are equal to part-time wages in for-profit centers. This is not a common
result in the literature, but it is not without precedent.  Blank (1990) also found that selection-
adjusted wages of part-time workers were higher than comparable full-time workers.  She was
unable to do her analysis using compensation because of lack of data. In nonprofit centers, the
compensation mark-up is also in favor of part-timers, and larger than wage mark-up in
magnitude (24.9 percent).  This indicates that not only part-time workers￿ wages are higher
than full-time workers￿ wages in nonprofit centers, but part-time workers receive more benefits
per hour worked than full-time workers in the nonprofit sector.
Although part-time workers￿ wages are equivalent to full-time workers￿ wages in for-
profit centers, the average compensation of part-time workers is 23 percent higher than that of
full-time workers in for-profit centers, indicating that, similar to the pattern in nonprofit
centers, for-profit centers provide more benefits to part-time workers.  These results are in
sharp contrast to the raw data revealed in Table 2.
The bottom part of Table 10 demonstrates that full-time workers￿ wages are 5.8 percent
higher in the nonprofit sector in comparison to what they would have earned in the for-profit
sector.  The nonprofit full-time mark-up is 7.8 percent in compensation.  Part-time workers￿
wages and compensation are higher in the nonprofit sector in comparison to the for-profit
sector.  However, the mark-up is smaller in compensation, suggesting that for-profit centers
provide better benefits than nonprofit centers in the case of part-time workers.
These results indicate that part-time jobs are good jobs in child care.  The fact that the
raw wage differences are in favor of full-time workers may imply that, as suggested by Blank
(1990),  part-time workers may have earned lower wages even when they worked full-time,
due to additional unobserved worker or job attributes.  The results also support the property
rights hypothesis as we uncover significant nonprofit wage and compensation differentials.
                                                     
8  The standard errors for wage equations in pr-ft, np-ft, pr-pt and np-pt are  0.0045, 0.0054, 0.0030
and 0.0009, respectively.  They are 0.0024, 0.0019, 0.0013 and 0.0017 for compensation equations.18
V. Sensitivity Analysis and Representativeness of the Data
Our analysis included detailed worker and firm attributes. Examples are ￿Organization￿
and ￿Important Job￿ for workers, and ￿Percent Subsidized,￿ ￿Center Age,￿ ￿Part-week,￿
￿Extended Care,￿ ￿Head Start,￿ ￿Before and After School,￿ ￿Summer Camp,￿ ￿Evening
Care,￿ ￿Sick Care,￿ and ￿24 Hour Care￿ for firms. To investigate the importance of
controlling for these worker and firm characteristics, we omitted these variables from the
system and re-estimated the models.  Omission of these variables implies 44 restrictions on the
unrestricted models reported in Tables 5-6 and 8-9.  The calculated likelihood ratio was 614.46
for the wage model, and 652.6 for compensation, strongly rejecting the hypothesis that these
worker and firm attributes are unimportant.  Furthermore, with the omission of these variables
both wage and compensation models provided different results regarding the mark-ups in
comparison to the ones reported in Table 10.  More specifically, the nonprofit wage mark-up
for full-time workers became -5.1 percent (as opposed to the positive 5.8 percent reported in
Table 10).  Similarly, the nonprofit compensation differential for full-time workers (reported
as 7.8 percent in Table 10) is estimated as ￿2.1 percent in the restricted model.
In addition to the omitted variables mentioned above, we further reduced the models by
omitting the following firm characteristics: ￿On-site,￿ ￿National Chain,￿ ￿Publicly
Supported,￿ ￿Publicly Owned,￿ ￿Publicly Regulated,￿ and ￿Religious.￿  In other words, we
made our models similar to other papers in the literature which included information on
nonprofit status of the firm, but did not have additional information about the details of the
ownership.  These additional omitted variables generate an additional 16 restrictions.  We
found that these additional restrictions hurt the models even further. The calculated likelihood
ratio was 235.4 for the wage system (while the one-percent critical value is 32 for 16 degrees
of freedom), and 48.4 for the compensation system. The nonprofit wage differential for full-
time workers was  ￿4.7 percent, and the full-time mark-up in the for-profit sector was 6.2
percent. Once again, the results are different from the ones obtained from the original models.
This exercise underscores the importance of detailed worker and firm characteristics, and
highlights the incorrect inferences that can be made in their absence.
  Can these results be attributable to some anomaly of the child care industry?  To
entertain this question, we used the Five-Percent Public Use Sample (PUMS) of the 199019
census.  We extracted all workers with positive wages and salary income who worked in
hospitals, nursing and personal care facilities, elementary and secondary schools, colleges and
universities, educational services, bus service and urban transit, and research, development and
testing services. These industries have bigger nonprofit presence than others.  To investigate
the raw nonprofit and full-time wage differentials in these industries we ran regressions of the
logarithm of wages on nonprofit and full-time dummies as well as state dummies. The results
are reported in Table 11.  The nonprofit wage premium is positive in all cases, although not
significant in educational services.  Raw full-time wage mark-up is zero in hospitals, and
negative in nursing and personal care, but positive everywhere else.  Thus, the descriptive
information from the 1990 census shows that the raw nonprofit and full-time mark-ups of the
child care industry are similar to those observed in many other industries with a significant
nonprofit presence, indicating that our results are not likely to be driven by some idiosyncratic
structure of the child care industry.
 VI. Summary
This paper uses a rich employer-employee matched data set to investigate the existence
and the extent of nonprofit and part-time wage and compensation differentials.   Utilizing data
exclusively on child care workers we avoid potential contamination of results due to inter-
industry unobservables.  The raw data reveal wage and compensation premiums in favor of
nonprofit workers.  They also reveal the existence of wage and compensation premiums in
favor of full-time workers in for-profit centers, and compensation premium in favor of full-
time workers in the nonprofit sector.  An analysis of the 1990 Census data shows that these
raw differentials are similar to those found in many industries significant nonprofit sector
presence.
The empirical strategy adjusts for workers￿ self-selection into the for-profit or nonprofit
sectors, as well as into full-time or part-time work.  We also control for unobserved worker
heterogeneity using a discrete factor model.  The wage and compensation equations are
estimated jointly with the selection equations using full-information maximum likelihood.
We find differences between the regimes (full-time for-profit, full-time nonprofit, part-
time for-profit, part-time nonprofit) in the way in which human capital of the workers are
rewarded.  For example, in both for-profit and nonprofit sectors, the return to education is20
higher for part-time workers.  For full-time workers, the return to tenure is higher in for-profit
centers.  In nonprofit centers, the return to experience in child care for full-time workers is
higher than that of part-time workers, and in for-profit centers the return to experience outside
child care is higher for full-time workers.
There is substantial variation in wages as a function of employee characteristics, and
there is variation in wages within sectors.  For example, unionization increases wages and
compensation 20-25 percent, and centers that are part of a national chain provide lower wages
and compensation.  Other examples are the job title of the worker and the age group of the
children he/she is serving.   Similarly, center characteristics such as the age and the size of the
center, whether the center is publicly supported, publicly owned or regulated, whether it is a
religious center impact wages and compensation.  Along the same lines, various programs
offered by the centers (e.g. sick care, evening care) have significant impacts.
We provide the first direct test of the labor donation hypothesis. A question is
specifically included in the survey given to the workers to identify the primary reason for the
worker￿s choice of employment in child care.  Workers who chose the alternative ￿this is an
important job someone needs to do,￿ receive two to five percent lower wages in the nonprofit
sector, which supports labor donation hypothesis.
After estimating the models, we calculate the wage and compensation that each worker
in our sample would have received under each regime after controlling for non-random
selection and unobserved worker heterogeneity.  We find that potential wages of part-time
workers are equivalent to those of full-time workers in the for-profit sector, and they are
higher in the nonprofit sector.  Part-time workers￿ compensation is higher than that of full-
timers in both sectors, and the compensation mark-up is larger than the wage mark-up.  This
suggests that part-time workers receive more benefits in both sectors.  We find evidence of
positive nonprofit wage differentials for both full-time and part-time workers.  Compensation
is also higher in the nonprofit sector for both types of workers.
The magnitudes of these differentials are substantial.  For example, nonprofit wage
differential is almost six percent for full-time workers and 20 percent for part-time workers.
Nonprofit compensation differential is eight percent for full-time workers and 10 percent for
part-time workers.  Similarly, part-time workers earn wages that are 13 percent more than full-
time workers in nonprofit centers.  Part-time compensation is 25 percent more than full-time21
compensation in nonprofit centers, and 23 percent more in for-profit centers.
These results underscore important points.  First, it seems critical to control for the
impact of worker self-selection into sector and into full-time work.  Second, it is important to
have detailed controls for both employer and employee characteristics as they have significant
impacts.
The results indicate that part-time jobs are ￿good￿ jobs in center-based child care.
Furthermore, despite the evidence supporting the labor donation hypothesis, our results
indicate the existence of nonprofit wage and compensation premiums, which support the
property rights hypothesis.22
Table 1
Average Wage and Compensation
Wage Compensation
Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time
California Nonprofit 8.24 7.71 10.00* 8.90*
For-Profit 8.12* 7.19* 9.38* 8.00*
Colorado Nonprofit 6.38 6.19 7.37 6.80
For-Profit 5.68 5.65 6.49 6.17
Connecticut Nonprofit 8.37* 9.39* 10.42 10.77
For-Profit 7.41 7.24 8.56 8.20
North Carolina Nonprofit 5.97 5.58 7.09* 5.70*
For-Profit 5.27* 4.94* 5.95* 5.07*
The entries are average wage or compensation for the relevant group. A box indicates that the averages
are significantly different between nonprofit and for-profit sectors at the 5 percent level or less. A star
indicates that wage or compensation is different between full-time and part-time in the corresponding
row at the 5 percent level or less.23
Table 2
Raw Full-time and Nonprofit Wage and
Compensation Differentials
Full-time Differential
In nonprofit centers In for-profit centers
W














For full-time workers For part-time workers
W















W stands for wage, C stands for compensation, ft represents full-time, pt represents part-time,
np means nonprofit, and pr is for-profit.24
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Workers
Variable Definition Mean Standard
Deviation
Wage The hourly pre-tax wage rate. 6.934 (2.582)
Compensation The hourly compensation 8.02 (3.20)
Full ￿Time Dummy (=1) if the worker works full-time 0.646 (0.478)
Female Dummy(=1) if female 0.968 (0.176)
Age Age of the worker 33.323 (11.644)
Tenure Tenure at the center (in months) 38.123 (48.584)
Experience Years of experience in early education and child care 7.726 (6.498)





Dummy(=1) if no high school diploma 0.026 (0.16)
High School Dummy(=1) if high school graduate or GED 0.187 (0.39)
Some College Dummy(=1) if some college courses 0.339 (0.474)
Community College Dummy(=1) if two year college degree 0.142 (0.349)
College Dummy(=1) if four year college degree 0.189 (0.392)
Some Graduate
School
Dummy(=1) if some graduate school 0.069 (0.253)
Graduate Degree Dummy(=1) if graduate degree 0.045 (0.208)
No Training Dummy(=1) if no special training in early childhood
education
0.139 (0.346)
Assistant Teacher Dummy(=1) if assistant teacher 0.425 (0.495)
Infant-Toddler
Room
Dummy(=1) if the worker works in an infant-toddler
room
0.323 (0.468)
Own Kids Worker￿s number of children 0.985 (1.244)
Own Kids At
Center
Dummy(=1) if any of worker￿s children is cared for in the
same center
0.153 (0.36)
Organization Dummy(=1)  if the worker belongs to a professional
organization
0.241 (0.428)
Important Job If the worker￿s main reason to choose employment in child
care is ￿this is an important job that someone needs to
do.￿
0.262 (0.44)
Single Dummy(=1) if the worker is single 0.350 (0.477)




White Dummy (=1) if the worker is white 0.684 (0.465)
Hispanic Dummy(=1) if the worker is Hispanic 0.115 (0.319)
Black Dummy(=1) if the worker is African-American 0.128 (0.334)
Asian Dummy(=1) if the worker is Asian or Pacific Islander 0.024 (0.154)
Other Race Dummy(=1) if the worker is of some other race. 0.046 (0.210)
Household Income1 Dummy (=1) if the worker￿s last year￿s total before-tax
household income < $10,000
0.178 (0.383)
Household Income2 Dummy (=1) if last year￿s total before-tax household
income  is between $10,000 and $19,999
0.239 (0.426)
Household Income3 Dummy (=1) if last year￿s total before-tax household
income  is between $20,000 and $29,999
0.172 (0.378)
Household Income4 Dummy (=1) if last year￿s total before-tax household
income  is between $30,000 and $39,999
0.149 (0.356)
Household Income5 Dummy (=1) if last year￿s total before-tax household
income  is between $40,000 and $49,999
0.092 (0.289)
Household Income6 Dummy (=1) if last year￿s total before-tax household













Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Full ￿Time 0.681* (0.467) 0.615* (0.487) 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female 0.978 (0.148) 0.959 (0.198) 0.969 (0.175) 0.967 (0.178)
Age 31.392* (10.96) 35.093* (11.977) 32.324* (11.124) 35.148* (12.348)
Tenure 30.237* (40.751) 45.351* (53.82) 35.790* (45.311) 42.387* (53.861)
Experience 7.226* (6.299) 8.184* (6.649) 7.679 (6.346) 7.813 (6.776)
Other Experience 6.641 (6.592) 6.756 (6.630) 6.557 (6.500) 6.963 (6.804)
Less Than High School 0.016* (0.126) 0.035* (0.184) 0.019 (0.138) 0.038 (0.192)
High School 0.190 (0.393) 0.183 (0.387) 0.188 (0.391) 0.183 (0.387)
Some College 0.331 (0.471) 0.346 (0.476) 0.339 (0.474) 0.339 (0.474)
Community College 0.131 (0.338) 0.152 (0.359) 0.149 (0.357) 0.128 (0.335)
College 0.232* (0.423) 0.150* (0.357) 0.196 (0.397) 0.178 (0.383)
Some Graduate School 0.053* (0.223) 0.083* (0.277) 0.064 (0.245) 0.077 (0.266)
Graduate Degree 0.046 (0.211) 0.044 (0.206) 0.040 (0.197) 0.055 (0.228)
No Training 0.141 (0.349) 0.137 (0.344) 0.136 (0.343) 0.145 (0.352)
Assistant Teacher 0.386* (0.487) 0.461* (0.499) 0.360* (0.480) 0.544* (0.499)
Infant-Toddler Room 0.410* (0.492) 0.243* (0.429) 0.357* (0.480) 0.260* (0.439)
Own Kids 0.857* (1.221) 1.102* (1.254) 0.892* (1.178) 1.153* (1.342)
Own Kids at Center 0.200* (0.400) 0.109* (0.312) 0.160 (0.367) 0.139 (0.347)
Organization 0.176* (0.381) 0.302* (0.459) 0.233 (0.423) 0.257 (0.437)
Important Job 0.240 (0.428) 0.281 (0.450) 0.268 (0.443) 0.251 (0.434)
Single 0.378 (0.485) 0.324 (0.468) 0.383* (0.486) 0.290* (0.454)
Married 0.535 (0.499) 0.554 (0.498) 0.511* (0.500) 0.607* (0.489)
Hispanic 0.085* (0.279) 0.143* (0.350) 0.120 (0.325) 0.107 (0.309)
Black 0.079* (0.270) 0.172* (0.378) 0.142* (0.349) 0.101* (0.302)
Asian 0.028 (0.166) 0.020 (0.141) 0.018 (0.133) 0.036 (0.185)
Other Race 0.055 (0.227) 0.039 (0.194) 0.042 (0.200) 0.055 (0.228)
Household Income1 0.188 (0.391) 0.169 (0.375) 0.194* (0.396) 0.148* (0.355)
Household Income2 0.234 (0.424) 0.243 (0.429) 0.277* (0.448) 0.169* (0.376)
Household Income3 0.152 (0.359) 0.191 (0.393) 0.185 (0.389) 0.148 (0.355)
Household Income4 0.154 (0.361) 0.144 (0.352) 0.138 (0.345) 0.169 (0.376)27
(Table 3A concluded)
Household Income5 0.085 (0.279) 0.098 (0.298) 0.082 (0.275) 0.109 (0.312)
Household Income6 0.188 (0.391) 0.156 (0.363) 0.124* (0.330) 0.257* (0.437)
N 495 540 669 366




Variable Definition Mean Standard
Deviation
For-Profit Dummy (=1) if the center if for-profit 0.478 (0.500)
National Chain Dummy variable (=1) if center is member of a
national chain.
0.123 (0.328)
On-Site Dummy variable (=1) if center is a worksite child
care center.
0.050 (0.219)
Publicly Regulated Dummy variable (=1) if center receives public
money tied to higher standards, (=0) otherwise.
0.065 (0.246)
Publicly Owned Dummy variable (=1) if center is publicly owned
and operated, (=0) otherwise.
0.081 (0.273)
Publicly Supported Dummy variable (=1) if center is not public1y
owned or operated, but receives more than 50
percent of its revenue from public grants, fees and
USDA reimbursement, (=0) otherwise
0.079 (0.270)
Religious Dummy variable (=1) if center is religiously
affiliated, (=0) otherwise
0.213 (0.409)
Union Dummy variable (=1) if center workers are
unionized.
0.059 (0.236)
Percent Subsidized The proportion of children that are subsidized. 0.207 (0.307)
Center Age Number of years that center has been in operation. 13.412 (13.824)
Part-Week Dummy (=1) if part-week program 0.800 (0.400)
Extended Care Dummy(=1) if part-day extended care program 0.586 (0.493)
Head Start Dummy(=1) if Head Start program 0.021 (0.144)
Before And After School Dummy(=1) if center provides before and after
school care
0.573 (0.495)
Summer Camp Dummy(=1) if center provides summer camp
programs for school-agers
0.476 (0.500)
Evening Care Dummy(=1) if center provides evening care 0.041 (0.197)
Weekend Care Dummy(=1) if center provides weekend care 0.018 (0.134)
Sick Care Dummy(=1) if center provides sick care 0.029 (0.168)
24-Hour Care Dummy(=1) if center provides 24 hour care 0.002 (0.044)
FTE Children Full-time equivalent children at the center 74.133 (47.104)
Unemployment The unemployment rate in the city where the
center is located in 1992
6.970 (2.060)29
Table 4 (concluded)
California Dummy (=1) if the center is in California. 0.270 (0.444)
Colorado Dummy (=1) if the center is in Colorado. 0.275 (0.447)
Connecticut Dummy (=1) if the center is in Connecticut. 0.242 (0.429)
North Carolina Dummy (=1) if the center is in North Carolina. 0.213 (0.409)30
Table 5
Estimated Selection Equations
System with Wage Equations
Variable





























































































Head Start -- 0.199
(0.154)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































      Estimated standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.
     * indicates statistical significance between 5% and 1%.
     ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level or better.34
Table 7
Hypotheses t-statistic
For Full-time workers,  returns to ￿
Tenure -Pr = Tenure ￿Np 3.627
Experience ￿Pr = Experience ￿Np -4.129 I
Other Experience-Pr = Other Experience -Np 0.599
High School ￿Pr = High School ￿Np -1.078
Community College -Pr = Community College -Np -1.671
College -Pr = College ￿Np -2.661
Graduate Degree -Pr = Graduate Degree-Np -6.521
Special Training -Pr = Special Training -Np 
a 1.271
For Part-time workers,  returns to ￿
Tenure ￿ Pr = Tenure ￿Np 0.863
Experience ￿Pr = Experience ￿Np -2.702 II
Other Experience ￿Pr = Other Experience -Np -4.913
High School ￿Pr = High School ￿Np 1.379
Community College -Pr = Community College ￿Np 6.287
College-Pr = College ￿Np 1.761
Graduate Degree -Pr = Graduate Degree -Np -2.029
Special Training -Pr = Special Training ￿Np 
a 2.582
In For-profit centers, returns to ￿
Tenure -Ft = Tenure-Pt -0.972
Experience -Ft, Pr = Experience ￿Pt, Pr 0.423 III
Other Experience -Ft, Pr = Other Experience -Pt, Pr 2.599
High School ￿Ft = High School ￿Pt -6.348
Community College ￿Ft = Community College -Pt -8.584
College -Ft = College ￿Pt -7.558
Graduate Degree -Ft = Graduate Degree -Pt -6.488
Special Training -Ft = Special Training ￿Pt 
a -0.061
In Nonprofit centers, returns to ￿
Tenure -Ft = Tenure ￿Pt -6.252
Experience ￿Ft = Experience ￿ Pt 2.820 IV
Other Experience -Ft = Other Experience -Pt -2.980
High School ￿Ft = High School ￿Pt -5.231
Community College ￿Ft = Community College -Pt -2.444
College -Ft = College ￿ Pt -3.735
Graduate Degree -Ft = Graduate Degree -Pt -2.239
Special Training -Ft= Special Training ￿Pt 
a 0.683
 Pr stands for For-profit, Np is nonprofit, FT stands for full-time, Pt is part-time.
 a Because the coefficient of special training is negative in al wage equations, a negative value for the






























































































Head Start -- 16.868**
(0.722)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses.
* indicates statistical significance between 5% and 1%.
** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level or better.39
Table 10
Selection and Heterogeneity Adjusted
Full-time and Nonprofit Wage and
Compensation Differentials
Full-time Differential
In nonprofit centers In for-profit centers
W














For full-time workers For part-time workers
W















W stands for wage, C stands for compensation, ft represents full-time, pt represents
part-time, np means nonprofit, and pr is for-profit. Percent differences are reported




fp}-1, where X is the
average wage or compensation for the relevant regime from Table 10.  Thus, the
negative values for full-time differentials indicate that full-time wages and
compensation are smaller than the corresponding part-time values.40
Table 11











Elementary and Secondary Schools 0.104  (0.005) 0.286  (0.006) 84,635 0.63
Colleges and Universities 0.211  (0.006) 0.402  (0.006) 62,880 0.58
Educational Services 0.001  (0.021) 0.252 (0.024) 5,339 0.48
Hospitals 0.187  (0.003) 0.005  (0.004) 202,636 0.44
Savings Institutions, including
Credit Unions
0.060  (0.012) 0.274  (0.014) 13,295 0.21
Research, Development and
Testing Services
0.022  (0.012) 0.463  (0.017) 20,764 0.21
Nursing and Personal Care 0.115  (0.006) -0.025  (0.006) 70.786 0.19
Bus  Service and Urban Transit 0.154  (0.020) 0.120  (0.014) 64,908 0.09
The dependent variable is the logarithm of wages, which is calculated as the ratio of  wage or salary
income divided by the product of usual hours worked per week and weeks worked . The entries are the
coefficients of the nonprofit and full-time dummies.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  The
regressions also include state dummies.41
APPENDIX
Calculation of Compensation
Each center provided information about the total dollar value of their nonwage benefits.
Each centers also provided detailed information about 11 different benefits provided for three
worker categories (teacher, assistant teachers, and part-timer) that involve monetary costs to
the center.  For example, centers indicated whether fully-paid or partially-paid health insurance
is provided for teachers, assistant teachers and part-timers as a benefit.  Other examples are at
least partially paid dental insurance, paid vacations, paid maternity leave, paid health insurance
for dependents, and paid sick or personal leave.  For each center we counted the total number
of benefits provided for each worker category.  Because we know the job title and hours of
work of each worker, we calculated the annual hours worked by full-time teachers, annual
hours of full-time aides and annual part-time hours.  Using this information and the proportion
of line-item benefits provided to each group, we calculated hourly benefits that can be assigned
to each group of worker.  Hourly compensation for each worker is her reported hourly wage
plus hourly non-wage benefits for her job category.
Likelihood Function
Conditional on the heterogeneity, the likelihood function contribution for child worker i
is
Li (|j ) =  [Pr{Profit i =1|j }.Pr{Full-timei =1|j}.f (Wi
ft-p j)]
 (FTi) (PRi)
[Pr{Profit i =0|j}.Pr{Full-timei =1|j}.f (Wi
ft-np |j)]
 (FTi) (1-PRi)
[Pr{Profit i =1|j}.Pr{Full-timei =0|j}.f (Wi
pt-p |j)]
 (1-FTi) (PRi)
[Pr{Profit i =0|j}.Pr{Full-timei =0|j}.f (Wi
pt-np |j)]
 (1-FTi) (1-PRi)
where  is the vector containing the parameters to be estimated, f(.) is the density function of
the distribution in the wage equations, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. FT is a
dummy variable for full-time work, and PR is a dummy variable for for-profit sector.
Applying the discrete factor method, and using the case with two factors (L=2), each
with N points of support in its distribution,
where p1l  is the probability that the first factor takes on the value 1l , and p2m is the probability
that the second factor takes on the value  2m . 	 is the vector containing the parameters of the
discrete distributions (ρ￿s, p￿s and ￿s).
) | (   L , (   L 2 , 1 i
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